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RECENT CASES
OLIVER A. PARKER*
RIGHT TO SUE
Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975).
This appeal stems from two interlocutory orders rendered in a treble
damage suit under the Clayton Act (Act). The first order decreed that the
governments of India, Iran, the Philippines and South Vietnam are "per-
sons" under the Act and are entitled to sue to collect damages resulting
from an alleged conspiracy to fix prices on antibiotics purchased by the
governments. The second order held that the governments have standing to
sue as parens patriae to collect damages for antibiotics sold to the plaintiffs'
citizens without complying with the requirements of Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure for class actions ('Rule 23).
The district court refused to certify the first order and the defend-
ants, Pfizer, Inc. and five other major pharmaceutical firms, sought review
by means of mandamus. The court noted that the district court "was pre-
sented with a difficult question of statutory interpretation, apparently of
first impression," and that even if the district court's "interpretation were
erroneous (the court intimated no view on the merits), under the circum-
stances it would not constitute a clear abuse of discretion" warranting
the issuance of the writ.
As to the second order (which was certified by the district court), the
defendants relied for reversal on the holding of Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251 (1972). In Hawaii, the Supreme Court ruled that a state
could not bring a parens patriae action to collect the damage claims of its
citizens if they were legally entitled to sue in their own behalf on the
grounds that such suits violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.
The plaintiffs attempted to distinguish Hawaii on the grounds that in
the present action foreign governments and their resident nationals were
*J. D. Candidate, University of Miami School of Law.
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involved and "that the relationship between a foreign government and its
citizens is not restricted by the Constitution of the United States" [citing
Misc. Order No. 74-37, Appendix at 18, 21].
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that foreign sov-
ereigns do not possess the right to press their citizens' claims in a manner
barred to domestic states vis- i-vis their citizens. The court further inti-
mated (but did not decide) that unless the foreign nationals whose treble
damage claims were being litigated were given notice of, and an oppor-
tunity to participate in, or exclude themselves from, the litigation, their
property rights under the Fifth Amendment would be violated [citing
Guesse/eldt v. Mcgrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952) and United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942)]. The court also suggested that if the district
court's holding that foreign governments are "persons" who are entitled
to sue under the Act is ultimately upheld, then the plaintiffs can pursue
their citizens' treble damage claims by complying with the requirements of
Rule 23 for class actions.
The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied and the order of
the district court allowing the plaintiffs' parens patriae suit was reversed.
REGULATION OF FOREIGN COMMERCE
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., 402 F.Supp.
244, 251 (1975).
Plaintiffs, Zenith Radio Corp. and several other American manufac-
turers of electronic products, brought a treble damage antitrust action
under the Antidumping Act of 1916 and Section Two of the Robinson-
Patman Act against Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. and thirteen
other Japanese manufacturers, their distributors, and their importers.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants discriminated in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality by
selling their products to purchasers in the United States at prices less than
those charged to purchasers of those same products in Japan.
The defendants moved to dismiss the Antidumping action on the
grounds that the act was unconstitutionally vague, and to dismiss the
Robinson-Patman action because the act does not apply to price discrimina-
tions between products sold in the United States and those sold in foreign
countries.
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As to the Antidumping action, the court felt that the defendants'
motion was totally devoid of merit and "that the Antidumping Act of 1916,
which prohibits systematic price discrimination between purchasers in
different national markets when the discrimination is practiced with a
predatory intent, gives potential defendants sufficient notice of the conduct
it proscribes" to survive the constitutional scrutiny mandated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In construing the Robinson-Patman Act, the court agreed with the de-
fendants that the term "commodities" as used in the clause "where such
commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States . . ." refers to the same commodities referred to in the phrase "to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality"; and that therefore, the commodities involved in both
legs of an alleged price discrimination must be sold for use, consumption,
or resale within the United States [citing the Report of the White House
Task Force on Antitrust Policy (1968), Appendix C at 5-6]. In reaching
this conclusion, the court rejected the plaintiffs' "in terrorem" argument
that a refusal to extend the reach of the Robinson-Patman Act to include
price discrimination between purchasers in different national markets
would undermine the broad national policy reflected in the antitrust laws
of fostering fair and vigorous competition in the United States on the
grounds that the Antidumping Act of 1916 provides a more than adequate
remedy for any alleged unfair pricing practices.
The defendants motion to dismiss the Antidumping action was denied,
and the Robinson-Patman action was dismissed.
LIABILITY OF AIR CARRIERS
(1) Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975).
The litigation giving rise to this appeal revolves about the personal
injury claims of the victims of a terrorist attack at the Hellenikon Airport
in Athens, Greece. At the time of the attack, the plaintiffs, in preparation
for embarkation, had surrendered their tickets, passed through passport
control, and entered the area reserved exclusively for those about to depart
on international flights. The passengers assembled, under the direction of
TWA's agents, by the departure gate and were preparing for a wapons
search which was a prerequisite to boarding. Otherwise, the passengers
were ready to proceed to the aircraft. On these facts the district court
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found TWA liable under Art. 17 of the Warsaw Convention as modified
by the Montreal Agreement (Convention) for the deaths and bodily in-
juries resulting from the terrorist attack.
On appeal, TWA contended that liability under the Convention should
not attach while passengers are inside the terminal building, and that the
very earliest time at which liability ought to commence is when the pas-
sengers step through the terminal gate. To support this claim, TWA relied
on the rejection by the delegates to the convention of the CITEJA draft
providing for liability from the moment the passenger enters the airport
of departure.
In rejecting TWA's argument, the court noted that the delegates also
rejected Brazil's proposal that liability not attach until after the passengers
were actually inside the aircraft. In the court's view, under the provisions
of Art. 17, the issue was not whether the passengers had been inside or
outside the terminal building, but whether they had begun the process of
embarkation. Given the passengers' activity (which was a condition to
embarkation), the restriction on their movements, the imminence of board-
ing, and their position adjacent the terminal gate, the court held that it
would best comport with the Montreal Agreement's intent to impose strict
liability without fault and to spread as widely as possible the risk of loss
to hold that the plaintiffs were in the course of embarkation and that the
defendant was liable under the Convention.
The lower court's finding of liability was affirmed.
(2) In Re Tel Aviv, 405 F.Supp. 154 (1975)
Plaintiffs, victims of a terrorist attack in the baggage area of the
terminal building at Lod International Airport near Tel Aviv, Israel,
brought an action against Air France under Art. 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention as modified by the Montreal Agreement (Convention) to recover
damages for the deaths and personal injuries that resulted from the attack.
Air France moved for summary judgment on the ground that the
Convention was inapplicable to these actions. The plaintiffs filed cross-
motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability, asserting
that the Convention did apply.
The material facts were undisputed. On arrival at Lod Airport, the
plane came to a halt about one-third to one-half mile from the Terminal
Building. The plaintiffs descended movable stairs to the ground and then
walked or rode on a bus to the terminal. There, they presented their pass-
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ports for inspection by Israeli immigration officials and then passed into
the main baggage area of the terminal. While the passengers were await-
ing the arrival of the last baggage from the plane, three Japanese terrorists
opened fire. From the time the plaintiffs stepped out onto the movable
stairs leading from the plane, all the facilities they used were owned and
operated by the State of Israel or El Al, the Israeli National Airline and
not by Air France.
Air France's argument was that when the terrorist "attack occurred,
the passengers, all of whom had exited the aircraft and entered the Ter-
minal Building, were no longer in the course of any of the operations of
disembarking, and hence, that the Convention did not apply to the plain-
tiffs' claims."
In finding for the defendant, the court referred to Day v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 393 F.Supp. 217 (1975), aff'd 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.
1975), which distinguished disembarkation on the grounds that "a pas-
senger who has left the aircraft, unlike the plaintiffs in Day, is not herded
in lines, and has few activities, if any, which the air carrier requires him
to perform ...as a condition of completing his journey." The court held
that an accident that occurs inside the baggage area of an airport after the
passengers have arrived at their destination has not occurred in the course
of disembarking operations and is not covered by the Convention [citing
MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971)].
Complaints dismissed to the extent that they claimed jurisdiction or
liability without fault under the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
IMMIGRATION
Pierre v. United States, 525 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1976).
The petitioners, 216 Haitian nationals, applied for a preliminary in-
junction to enjoin the Immigration and Naturalization Service from re-
fusing to authorize their employment pending final administrative and
judicial determination of their initial claim for refugee status pursuant to
the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Convention). The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction
to grant the relief sought and the petitioners appealed.
The issue on appeal was "whether, in a suit seeking habeas corpus
relief, the court has jurisdiction under its general equity powers to enter-
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tain an application for a mandatory injunction to require collateral admin-
istrative action independent of, and unrelated to, the issue of the legality
of the petitioners custody."
In deciding the issue, the court rejected the argument that because 8
U.S.C.A. §1182 (a) (14) prohibits aliens from seeking to enter the United
States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor unless the
Secretary of Labor certifies to the Secretary of State that they may enter,
the lower court lacked jurisdiction. The court held that the application of
§ 1182 (a) (14) to those seeking political asylum would, as a practical
matter, frustrate the intent behind the Convention. Hence, the court ruled
that the rights created by the convention were unaffected by the limita-
tions of § 1181(a)(14).
Though the court disagreed with the lower courts reasoning, it con-
curred with the result, holding that the jurisdiction conferred by a writ of
habeas corpus is confined to an examination of the record to determine
whether a person restrained of his liberty is detained without authority of
law, and that the only power the court possessed under the writ was the
power to release the petitioner if he was found to be unlawfully detained
[citing Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910) and Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1963)].
To reconcile its holding with the obvious intent of the Convention, the
court noted that it was only determining a court's authority under a writ
of habeas corpus and that its decision did not foreclose the possibility that
the petitioners might have standing to seek an independent action for dec-
laratory or injunctive relief under either 8 U.S.C.A. § 1329 or 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1331.
The decision below was affirmed.
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
United States v. A. L. Burbank & Co., Ltd, 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975).
An action was brought to enforce two summonses which had been
issued by the Internal Revenue Service ('IRS) to obtain information re-
quested by Canadian tax authorities pursuant to the Tax Treaty of 1942
between the United States and Canada (Treaty). The district court held
that absent a claim that United States income taxes are potentially due and
owing, the IRS could not properly utilize its summons authority under the
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1954 Internal Revenue Code (Code), section 7602, to obtain information
from American based companies solely for a Canadian tax investigation.
The United States appealed.
The parties agreed that the purpose of the Treaty was to provide a
means of cooperation between the United States and Canada whereby in-
formation could be exchanged after it was collected through the adminis-
trative processes provided by the statutory law of each nation, and that the
avowed intent behind the Treaty was to prevent tax evasion. Further, the
Treaty specifically provided that if Canada desired information to deter-
mine the liability of any person under Canadian revenue laws, the IRS
could furnish the same information that it would be entitled to obtain
under the United States Revenue Code. Finally, it was admitted that there
was nothing in the Treaty to indicate that this procedure could only be
employed in a case where there was concurrent tax liability in both
nations.
To circumvent the plain language of the Treaty, the appellees noted
that under Canada's construction of the Treaty, Canadian tax authorities
are authorized to obtain information relevant to United States tax evasion
if, and only if, there is a possibility of concurrent Canadian tax liability.
Hence, the appellees argued that since the intent of the Treaty was to pro-
vide for the exchange of information on a reciprocal basis, the United
States should not be under a greater obligation to furnish information than
is Canada.
The appellees also argued that under section 7602 of the Code the IRS
could only issue a summons to force the production of books and records
to determine the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax of
the United States.
The court rejected the appellees' first argument on the grounds that
"until a treaty has been denounced, it is the duty of both the government
and the courts to sanction the performance of the obligations reciprocal to
the rights which the treaty declares and the government asserts, even
though the other party to the treaty holds a different view of its meaning"
[citing Factor v. Laubenheimer 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933)].
As for the second argument, after examining both the Treaty and the
Code, the court concluded that in view of section 7852(d) of the Code
which provides that "no provision of the Code shall apply in any case
where its application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the
United States in effect on the date of the enactment of the Code," the
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limitation of the IRS's subpoena powers under section 7602 did not apply,
and the IRS could subpoena records for the Canadian Government.
The decision below was reversed.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 402 F.Supp. 951 (1975).
Plaintiff, a Greek seaman, brought suit under the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C.A. § 688 et seq., and general maritime law to recover for injuries
he allegedly sustained aboard the Konkar Intrepid, a vessel of foreign
registry, while the ship was in Baltimore harbor.
The defendant, Konkar Intrepid Corp., a Liberian corporation whose
principal stockholders were Greek and whose principal offices were in
Athens, Greece, moved for an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, or alternatively, for improper venue
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The court noted that no diversity jurisdiction existed since both the
plaintiff and the defendant were aliens [citing Joseph Muller Corp. v.
Societi Anonyme de Gerance et d'Armement, 451 F.2d 727, 729 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972)], and that whether plaintiff's
general maritime law claim raised a federal question under 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1331 depended on the applicability to the facts of the Jones Act [citing
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)].
The court found that the applicability of the Jones Act depended on
the substantiality of the contacts of the controversy with the United States,
and that of the seven factors of possible significance which a court might
consider in deciding the question, four (place of the ships registry, place
of the injury, place where the seaman's contract was made, and the 'inac-
cessibility of a foreign forum) have been accorded relatively little im-
portance, while the allegiance of the parties and the shipowner's base of
operations have been accorded the greatest significance [citing Moncada v.
Lemuria Shipping Corp., 491 F'2d 470, 472 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 947 (1974) ]. Hence, the court held that the benefits of the Jones Act
are not available in a suit against a foreign shipowner by a nonresident
seaman who seeks redress for injuries sustained on a vessel of foreign
registry where the foreign shipowner's major base of operations is outside
the United States, even though the injury complained of occurred within
the United States.
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While the court lacked diversity jurisdiction and though no federal
question was presented because the Jones Act was not applicable, the court,
sua sponte, found that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 conferred admiralty subject
matter jurisdiction over the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim for in-
juries, even though the plaintiff had not invoked the court's admiralty
jurisdiction [citing Gilmore &Black, The Law of Admiralty 40 (2d ed.
1975)]. However, the same facts that ruled against subject matter juris-
diction under the Jones Act led the court to decline jurisdiction under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens on the grounds, among others, that the
defendant had consented to appear before the appropriate court in Greece,
and had waived any defenses based on the statute of limitations or personal
jurisdiction [citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) and
Garis v. Compania, 386 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967)].
Complaint dismissed.
LIABILITY UNDER CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT
Cerro Sales Corp. v. Atlantic Marine Enterprises, Inc., 403 F.Supp. 562
(1975).
The plaintiff, Cerro Sales Corp. (Cerro), entered into a voyage char-
ter party with the defendant, Atlantic Marine Enterprises, Inc. (Atlantic),
the owner of the S.S. North America, to convey a cargo of copper con-
centrates from San Fernando, in the Philippines, to Callao, Peru. While
on route, a fire broke out in the boiler room of the North America and
due to the seriously understaffed condition of the ship, the fire spread and
the North America had to be abandoned.
Cerro filed suit under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA),
which had been incorporated into the charter party, for cargo loss and
transshipment expenses.
Atlantic defended on the grounds that (1) the damages were barred
by the statute of limitations provisions of COGSA, that (2) under both the
Fire Act (46 U.S.C.A. § 182) and the fire exceptions of COGSA, the de-
fendant was not liable, and that (3) in the event of liability, liability
should be limited to ship plus freight pursuant to 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-88.
Under COGSA, if a suit is not brought within one year of delivery
of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered, then
the action is barred. Had the fire not occurred, the court found that the
goods should have been delivered by July 16, 1968, but that the suit was
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
not filed until July 23, 1969. Cerro argued that it was informed by a
letter dated July 26, 1968 of the frustration of the voyage and asked to
take delivery in Honolulu, that delivery at that point constituted a reason-
able deviation under the "liberty clause" of the charter party, that the
cargo was not actually relinquished until that date, and hence, that it was
as of that date that the statute of limitations began to run.
In deciding for the plaintiff on the limitations issue, the court reason-
ed that if Atlantic was not personally at fault for the damage, the delivery
in Hawaii would be in furtherance of the agreement of the parties and the
statute would have begun to toll as of the date of delivery, while if the de-
fendant were personally responsible for the fire, the one year statute of
limitations would not be applicable [citing United States v. Wessel, Duval
& Co., 115 F.Supp. 678 (1953), and cf. Minex v" International Trading
Co., 303 F.Supp. 205 (1969)]. In either event, the statute would not bar
recovery.
As to the fire exemption issue, the court noted that "an inexcus-
able condition of unseaworthiness of a vessel, which in fact causes the
damage by either starting a fire or preventing its extinguishment, will ex-
clude the shipowners from the exemption of the Fire Act and COGSA"
[citing Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet
et Cyprien Fabre, 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973)]. Since the court found
that the ship was unseaworthy because it was so understaffed that the
crew was inadequate to handle a fire emergency, the court ruled for the
plaintiff and held Atlantic liable for the damages.
As to the question of limitation of liability under 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-
88, the court held that because Atlantic was culpably negligent, the limi-
tation of liability for loss could not be granted [citing Commercial Molas-
ses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 104 (1941) and Flan-
agan v. The H. F. Gilligan, 170 F.Supp. 217 (1959) ].
Accordingly, the court found the defendant liable for Cerro's damages
from loss of cargo.
